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1. Introduction
Philosophers and other theorists from a surprisingly wide range
of ethical perspectives have argued that harming animals in agribusiness, in the fashion industry, in research labs, and in other arenas—
that is, causing animals to experience pain, suffering, and death for
these purposes—is seriously morally wrong and that we individually
and collectively ought not to support these practices. The range of
ethical perspectives includes utilitarianism and other consequentialisms, rights-based deontologies, ideal contractarianisms, virtue
ethics, common-sense moralities, religious moralities, feminist ethics,
and more, indeed almost every major theoretical perspective in ethics.1
While there is a river of moral thinking in defense of animals,
defenses of common beliefs and attitudes regarding animal use are but
a trickle. Therefore, Tibor R. Machan’s book, Putting Humans First:
Why We Are Nature’s Favorite, an attempt to justify the status quo
regarding animal use and show why its critics are mistaken, is a
welcome contribution to the discussion.* Machan deserves credit for
—
*

Tibor Machan responds to the criticisms of Nathan Nobis and others in an
essay entitled “Rights, Liberation and Interests: Is there a Sound Case for Animal
Rights or Liberation,” which appears in New Essays in Applied Ethics: Animal Rights,
Personhood, and the Ethics of Killing, edited by Hon-Lam Li and Anthony Yeung (New
York: Palgrave & Macmillan, 2006). Given the publication of this recent response,
Professor Machan has decided not to publish yet another such reply in The Journal of
Ayn Rand Studies. —Ed.
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addressing these issues and going where too few philosophers and
other intellectuals have gone before, but we argue that his book is a
serious philosophical disappointment. Regrettably, it will not become
“the” case against moral perspectives that take animals seriously.
We offer our criticisms, however, in a friendly, constructive spirit.
This is because, based on some of what Machan writes, it seems that
he should be regarded as a philosophical friend of animals. While he
does not seem to intend this, his position seems to morally condemn
over 99% of the practices that cause animals to experience pain,
suffering, and death. We say “seems” because we argue that a careful
reader cannot tell exactly what Machan thinks are acceptable and
unacceptable uses of animals. Nevertheless, it seems that any
informed and consistent advocates of Machan’s views should
conclude that, in nearly all cases, animals should not be raised and
killed to be eaten, worn, and even experimented on: they should
agree with animal rights advocates on nearly all points of practice
about how animals ought to be treated. They might disagree about
some points of “theory,” but those disagreements might be merely
academic in the most trivial sense.

2. Staying on Target:
Distraction

Why “Rights” Can Be a

We trust that readers are familiar with the methods of husbandry,
use and killing routinely employed in agribusiness, the fur industry
and animal experimentation. Machan unfortunately does not provide
readers with such information, so we encourage readers to seek it out
so they might make more fully informed judgments and choices about
these matters.2 Understanding these factual conditions gives rise to
concrete and practical ethical questions, such as these: Is it morally
permissible to treat animals these ways or not? If so, why? If not,
what ways of treating animals would be morally permissible? Should
we support those who treat animals these ways or not?
Answering these questions can take us into moral theory to think
about the basic nature of the difference between right and wrong and
what general moral principles are true. In thinking about theory,
however, we must remember that for any conclusions about theory
we come to, we always need to ask what implications they have for
practice, in terms of the answers they suggest to the concrete
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questions asked immediately above.
Just as Machan avoids the empirical conditions of how animals
are raised and killed, much of his discussion of moral theory avoids
direct contact with these concrete questions about the rightness or
wrongness of actions that result in harms for animals. Machan’s focus
on “theory” might explain why much of his discussion is irrelevant to
the concrete question of whether such treatment of animals is right or
wrong. As an example of this avoidance, in his introduction and first
chapter (and throughout the book), he focuses on arguing that
animals do not have moral “rights.” Below we argue that his
arguments for this claim are unsuccessful, but what’s important to
remember is that even if they were sound and showed that no animals
have any moral rights, this would not yield answers to our concrete,
practical questions about how animals ought to be treated. This is
because, even if animals don’t have moral rights, there might be other,
non-rights-based reasons that would make it obligatory that we not
eat, wear or experiment on them. As Machan himself admits, “the
issue of rights does not exhaust the field of morality” (2004a, 21).
Because not all moral obligations depend on moral rights,
showing that animals have no moral rights has no immediate
implications for the concrete questions of whether they should be
raised and killed to be eaten, worn and experimented on. Talk of
moral rights, then, can be a huge red herring, a distraction from
whether an action or policy is morally permissible or not. Of course,
keeping our focus on the evaluations of actions in terms of whether
they are morally permissible or not, morally obligatory or not, does
not preclude our careful evaluation of Machan’s moral-theoretical
discussion, and to this we now turn.

3. Beating Strawmen? Avoiding Serious Philosophy
Machan’s first chapter, “A Case for Animal Rights?” begins by
asking us to consider the story of a boy whose arm was bitten off by
a seven-foot, two-hundred-pound shark. After the shark was wrestled
ashore and shot dead, a lifeguard retrieved the boy’s arm from the
gullet of the shark, and doctors reattached it.
Machan reports that although any sane person would agree that
it was right to kill the shark to retrieve Jessie’s arm, “there are
thousands of animal rights advocates around the world, including
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sundry Hollywood celebrities and high-profile academics with easy
access to the media,” who disagree because they believe “that human
beings are no more important than non-human beings” (3). And he
wonders why, after the shark was killed, “not one rabid radical
environmentalist galloped to the nearest media outlet to bray about
how wrong it is to slay a fish merely to smooth the life path of a
hegemonic human.”
This passage is an attack on a strawman. Few animal advocates,
philosophers, or activists would deny that a human is morally entitled
to use deadly force against an animal to fend off an attack or to
retrieve a limb that the animal has bitten off. (It’s telling that Machan
does not name any philosophers whose views entail that it would be
wrong to engage in self-defense in such a bizarre circumstance.) This
is because this issue is, plausibly, one of self-defense, not whether
“human beings are no more important than non-human beings.”
Defenders of animal rights, like defenders of human rights, believe in
the right to self-defense and rights to bodily protection (and even
restoration, as in this case), whether the aggressor is an animal or a
human.
But to keep our discussion directed towards the relevant issues we
must ask: If Machan thinks that it’s morally permissible to defend
ourselves from sharks in this way, does this entail that standard
practices in farms, slaughterhouses, and labs are also morally permissible? This would be a remarkable inference; if it was intended, it surely
needs defense. Thus, it seems that Machan introduces the issues to
readers with an example that is irrelevant to the important questions.
The simplistic view that Machan is interested in attacking—that
animals are simply “more important” than humans and so their
interests should always be placed above those of humans, even in a
violent conflict between a shark and a boy—is one that no serious
philosopher holds. On the contrary, as we will see below, most
philosophers arguing for animal rights are merely calling for the
recognition of a negative right: the right to be left alone and not
harmed. Animal advocates who do not rest their case on “rights”
defend similar claims.3
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4. Taking On Cases In Defense of Animals
In a variety of places in his book, Machan gives reasons to think
that no animals have “moral rights.” To understand the exact claim
for which he is arguing, we must understand what he means by moral
rights, since this term can be used in a variety of ways. What are these
moral rights that, Machan argues, no animals have? We need to
understand what moral rights are before we might understand why no
animals have them.
Machan’s explanation of what moral rights are is not entirely
clear. He claims that “To have a right means to be justified in
preventing those who have the choice from intruding on one within
a given sphere of jurisdiction” (5), and that “A right specifies a sphere
of liberty wherein the agent has full authority to act” (10). On this
view about rights, what might it mean to say that animals have no
moral rights? Apparently, this is to say that nobody is justified in
preventing someone from intruding on any animals’ “sphere of
jurisdiction.” This is rather cryptic and not what people typically seem
to be saying when they claim that animals have no moral rights, and
we will later see that Machan, surprisingly, affirms that animals have
rights in this sense.
Since Machan does not adequately explain what moral rights are
(or even note the wide variety of possible more specific moral rights,
e.g., a moral right not to be tortured, a right to respectful treatment,
a right not to suffer for trivial reasons, or a right not to be killed for
no good reason, etc.), we need to supplement the discussion. We can
pretend and suppose that rights are the only thing that would make
routine harms against animals wrong; on this (false) view, to say that
animals have no rights is just to say that these routine harms are
justified, not wrong. This suggestion at least helps us make Machan’s
discussion relevant to the concrete issues, since we are taken directly
to reasons that might justify harmful uses of animals.
So, on this view, why is the claim that some animals possess
moral rights, as Machan puts it, “a fiction” and “a trick”? Why are
people who think it’s wrong to harm animals for food and fashion,
among other uses, mistaken? This is because, on his view, a being has
moral rights, the properties that presumably would make it wrong to
harm it for pleasure or even serious benefits, only if that being has a
“moral nature,” that is, a “capacity” to see the difference between
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right and wrong and choose accordingly (xv, 10). Machan claims, “It
is this moral capacity that establishes a basis for rights, not the fact
that animals, like us, have interests or can feel pain.” Machan says
humans are of the “kind” of being that have such a moral nature and
animals are not and so concludes that humans have rights and animals
have none.
So, according to Machan, why is harmful treatments of animals
permissible, e.g., why is it okay to cause them pain and suffering for
the pleasures of eating them? Because animals have no “moral
nature.” Why would it be wrong to treat any humans in such a way?
Because they have such a “moral nature,” i.e., the capacity to make
moral decisions.
Those who have suffered greatly at the hands of others, or can
vividly imagine such an experience, might deny Machan’s hypothesis.
On his view, why would it be wrong to torture and kill you, the
reader, for no good reason? Not because of anything like this: it
would hurt, your serious interests would be set back greatly, doing so
would be disrespectful to you, and so on. It would be wrong because
you are able to make moral decisions. Those who have been
victimized might easily think that Machan is simply wrong about why
what their tormenters were doing was wrong. If so, they would think
that Machan’s argument for why humans have rights has a false
premise. We don’t have rights because we are moral agents, so his
argument against animal rights is unsound also, as it shares that false
premise.
Setting this aside, we must note that the premises of Machan’s
argument against animal rights and for human rights are imprecise:
true, we might agree that only humans have this capacity for discerning
right and wrong, but only some humans, not all. It’s not the case that
all humans who, intuitively, should not be treated as animals are
treated have this “moral nature” that Machan describes. They don’t
make moral decisions and so are not moral agents. Thus, Machan’s
theory of rights seems to provide no protection for vulnerable
humans—human babies, severely mentally challenged individuals, and
others (regrettably they are often called “marginal cases” or “marginal
humans”)—who are not moral agents and so lack the moral nature he
describes. So, if such humans have rights, this shows that Machan’s
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argument against animal rights is unsound because he has a mistaken
view of what is necessary for having any moral rights.4
Predictably, Machan disagrees with this evaluation of his
argument. He claims that, contrary to appearances, human babies and
severely mentally challenged individuals do not “lack moral agency
altogether” (16) and thus they have rights on his theory. But how can
this be? Machan explains that it’s not “the particular level of
intelligence or mental capacity of individual human agents but rather
on their particular type of consciousness, namely, what Ayn Rand has
called ‘volitional consciousness’ that makes humans moral agents”
(16). For this reason, only a human “completely stripped of conscious
faculty—for example, an irremediably brain-dead accident victim—
might be said to lack moral agency altogether” (16).
So, on Machan’s view, even though these beings do not make any
moral decisions (since, perhaps, they don’t make any decisions), they
are still moral agents and so have rights. This is simply because they
are humans, all human consciousness is “volitional,” having volitional
consciousness is sufficient (and necessary?) for having rights, and
therefore all humans who have any degree of consciousness—that is,
those who are not “vegetables” lacking any consciousness—have
rights. So, for example, even though a newborn baby makes no moral
decisions, Machan thinks this being is a moral agent now—not a
potential moral agent, or a being who will become a moral agent, but
an actual moral agent.
This response is arbitrary. Machan defines any level of consciousness found in a human being as “volitional” but defines any level of
consciousness found in animals as not volitional. But if “volitional”
has any meaning at all, it means having free will or having the ability
to make moral decisions. As Machan himself says, any human who
has the tiniest degree of consciousness does not lack moral agency
altogether; this proves that for Machan and for Objectivists, the
crucial aspect of “volitional consciousness”—assuming it’s not just a
mere synonym for moral agency—is that it includes some quality of
moral agency.
But clearly we can point to flesh-and-blood individuals who,
despite being conscious, can’t engage in moral reasoning —individuals
who’ve had lobotomies, have suffered severe brain damage, are
severely retarded, and so on. To insist that, despite this fact, these
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humans actually do have “volitional consciousness” simply because
no matter what their apparent incapacities are, they are human and
therefore all of their consciousness is always “volitional,” is to drain
the word “volitional” of any weight or meaning. It becomes an empty
term whose only role is to beg the question in favor of human
consciousness and to smuggle in the notion that merely being a
human with even the slightest degree of consciousness is sufficient to
be a moral agent. “Moral agency” or “volitional consciousness” then
becomes a capacity that depends, not on a being’s possession of
specific mental capacities, but merely on having human DNA and the
slightest degree of sentience. Thus, Machan’s response to this
objection fails.
In addition to his claim that having any degree of human
consciousness is enough to give you volitional consciousness or moral
agency, Machan thinks that it is illegitimate to draw any ethical
conclusions about animals by examining our ethical beliefs about
sentient humans who are not moral agents, and even lack the potential
to be moral agents. This is because he insists that we must consider
these kinds of humans as they would exist “normally, not abnormally”
and focus on the “healthy cases, not the special or exceptional ones”
(16; cf. 38, 40). Apparently, since these humans would “normally” be
moral agents, this is why they have moral rights, even though they are
not moral agents.
This response fails also. First, infants and children, at least, are
not “abnormal” cases: all human, adult moral agents were once
infants and children. They are normal stages in a normal life. Second,
why must we, as Machan insists, judge individual cases, some of
which are abnormal, as if they were “normal” ones? Machan simply
states this guideline without offering a reason for it. At first glance,
it seems that making ethical judgments about individuals based not on
their own traits but on the traits of normal members of their species
is faulty. After all, normal humans are not serial killers; does that
mean when deciding how to regard an exceptional, abnormal human
like Ted Bundy, we should consider only normal humans? To do so
would ignore this individual’s special, and morally relevant, features.
It seems that we have to judge people’s moral status by their individual traits, not by what is normal for their species. Machan reports:
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A Martian would learn little about human beings beyond the
strictly biological if he were instructed only about fetuses,
infants, and the mentally ill. Nor can earthlings discover
much about how to live their lives by contemplating such
cases.
And:
We do need to deal with borderline cases. But we can do so
only by applying and adapting the knowledge we acquire
from the normal case. We can’t start with the exception and
infer the rule. (16–17)
These responses do not help Machan’s position. It’s true that a
Martian would learn little about babies, and the mentally challenged,
and the senile, if he only examined healthy, normal adults. Likewise,
if a doctor studied only humans who had normal, healthy pancreases,
she would learn little about how to treat humans who have diabetes.
And if she studied only humans who have good vision, she would
learn little about treating the causes of blindness in humans.
It would seem, then, that whether we’re talking about medicine
or morality, to learn how to deal with normal cases, we have to look
at individual normal cases, and to learn how to deal with marginal
cases, we have to look at individual marginal cases. In other words,
we have to look at individuals. We treat beings according to their
own characteristics, not the features of other beings who are in some
ways similar to them but in other ways different, sometimes importantly so. Thus, in absence of reasons to the contrary, the fact that
normal humans are moral agents does not make abnormal humans
moral agents. Thus, they do not meet Machan’s explicitly stated
logically necessary condition for rights, his defense of the rights of
vulnerable humans fails, and thereby so does his argument that
animals have no moral rights.4
To further argue that animals have no rights, Machan claims that,
“If nonhuman animals had rights derived from their mere interests,
they would have obligations to other (interest-bearing) beings” (14).
He suggests that since animals have no obligations to anyone, they
have no rights either. But this does not follow: human babies
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presumably have the moral right not to be tortured, but they have no
duties or obligations to anyone. Machan fails to justify his assumption
to the contrary, even though it is part of the bedrock of his claim that
no animals can have any moral rights. Machan’s refutation of an
implausible and, as far as we know, undefended, theory of moral
rights—that if someone merely has an interest in something, then he or
she has a moral right to that thing—does little to defend his position
either.
While philosophers like Tom Regan, Peter Singer, and many
others, have spent decades developing ethical positions on the
treatment of animals, Machan’s presentation of their positions is very
brief, at most only a few pages in a very short book with very large
print. A careful reader would not get an accurate sense for what their
views are or what their arguments in favor of them are. Machan
wishes to criticize these views, but he only provides a caricature.
It seems, then, that this chapter provides no good reason to think
that animals cannot have moral rights. It also seems to provide an
either false explanation for why any humans have rights, or an inferior
one. Machan offers more remarks in later chapters to try to show
why animals have no moral rights, and we will address those below.
We will argue that these further remarks are equally unsuccessful in
providing good reasons to think that routine harms to animals are
morally justified.

5. Humans are of “the Highest Value in the Known
Universe”?
In his next chapter, “The Case for Speciesism,” Machan attempts
to explain why, by gaining an “objective understanding of nature,” we
can justify the view that “human beings are more important or
valuable than other aspects of nature, including plants and animals”
(29). He explains that, “Something is important or valuable when it
makes a positive or advantageous difference to something or someone
—as when we say that the sun is important for the plant or that his
home is a value to John” (30). By this standard, he thinks, humans are
“of the highest value in the known universe” (30).
A problem for this theory of value or importance is that since
nearly everything, and everyone, makes some positive “difference” to
something or someone, everything is important or valuable on this
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theory. Some might thus suspect this theory makes value too cheap.
While Machan provides no details about what determines what might
be of highest value, there is no a priori reason that any, and especially
all, humans would come out at the top of the scale. Machan notices
that the sun makes a big difference to plants (and everyone, for that
matter) but doesn’t conclude that it is of highest value, even though
his theory perhaps implies it is. So his theory of value seems to
provide little support for his sense that all humans are of highest
value.
In this chapter, Machan returns to his explanation for why
humans who are not moral agents nevertheless have rights, but in a
slightly different way. The following two passages are representative.
First:
The fact of occasional borderline cases is simply irrelevant to
the normal case— what is crucial is the generalization that
human beings are basically different from other animals by
virtue of a crucial threshold in a continuum of degrees. (40)
And, second:
To be sure, some people—infants and certain invalids—
cannot be characterized as fully responsible moral agents.
There are some who have become so ill or incapacitated that
we excuse their conduct even when they act in ways we
would normally consider reprehensible. But these are
exceptions, explained by reference to the special conditions
of debilitation or disease. (38)
It is not clear why Machan states that these cases are “explained
by reference to the special conditions of debilitation or disease.” Yes,
these humans are different from normal humans, but the moral
question is, why these individuals have moral rights even though they
lack the qualities that are necessary to have rights, according to
Machan’s theory.
One way to interpret Machan’s answer is this: he is asserting that
even though these human marginal cases lack moral agency and
volitional consciousness as individuals, these humans still have rights
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because they are members of a species for whom moral agency and
volitional consciousness are the norm. In general, his principle seems
to be this: to determine whether an individual has rights, we look not
at the individual’s capacities, but at what capacities are normal for
members of the being’s species.
But, again, this is a false principle. For example, normal human
adults have the basic hand-eye coordination that is necessary to drive
a car; we might plausibly think that this kind of hand-eye coordination
is a norm for the species. However, a blind human adult lacks this
hand-eye coordination. But so what? As Machan insists, when
deciding what rights an individual has, “The fact of occasional
borderline cases is simply irrelevant to the normal case . . .” It follows
then, on Machan’s reasoning, that blind people have a right to drive
a car (or just they should be allowed to do so) since the abilities
necessary for doing so are ones that normal humans have. But since
they don’t have this right, again we see that how individuals should be
treated is determined by what they are like as individuals, not by what
groups they are part of, or what is normal for others, or even what is
normal for their species.
As Machan repeatedly reminds us, normal humans don’t just have
rights: they also have obligations to others. Another consequence of
a species-based norm principle seems to be this: if a woman afflicted
with paranoid schizophrenia kills an innocent man because she
honestly believes that he is trying to kill her with deadly telepathic
thought-rays, we must hold her responsible for murder because she
failed in her obligations to not murder others. Why? Because being
a responsible agent is normal for her species and schizophrenia is
abnormal. However, Machan claims in several passages that animals
and humans who lack moral agency cannot be held responsible for
these kinds of actions. Unfortunately, before we can accept his theory
of “individualist anthropocentrism” and the rejection of animal rights
on which it rests, we need answers to these concerns about Machan’s
repeated appeals to the moral relevance of normalcy.
In a published reply to an earlier, shorter version of this review
posted on Nathan Nobis’s web site, Machan (2004b) tries to answer
the argument from marginal cases by accusing it of falling prey to
what he describes as the nitpicking “geometrical” reasoning popular
among logicians and analytic philosophers. In this case, this amounts
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to observing that if one says that something is a logically necessary
condition for having some property (e.g. having moral rights) then, if
that claim is true, things that do not meet that condition will lack that
property. He says this error results from treating humans like some
Platonic entity T, such as a triangle, that always must have certain
traits A, B, and C, or else it can’t correctly be characterized as a T.
Machan says we must accept that in the real world of biological
entities,
when something is properly defined, it will have the characteristics that are included in the definition in typical cases,
normally, mainly. So, for example, if being a human beings
[sic] means, in part, being a moral agent, the bulk of human
beings in the bulk of cases, typically, will be moral agents.
However, when they are asleep or in a coma or suffer from
serious mental impediments they will lack such moral agency.
. . . Nonetheless, human beings are moral agents, generally,
as a matter of their nature, over the long haul, normally.5
But, as have discussed above, the humans who lack Machan’s stated
logically necessary condition for having moral rights are not limited
to those who are deprived of moral agency only while asleep or in a
coma. These humans include those who have the potential to become
moral agents, such as infants and children, and even those who will
never be moral agents because they lack the biological potential, such
as the severely brain-damaged, the congenitally disabled, the senile,
the permanently insane, and so on. So Machan’s appeal to these
examples is unhelpful. Surprisingly, Machan (2004b) then goes on to
unravel his own response to such an objection:
The law treats us as [moral agents], for example, as do fellow
human beings as we go about our lives—we are evaluated for
whether we act morally or not, routinely, although in special
circumstances such evaluations would be misguided. So, for
example, sometimes people accused of a crime are excused
because they had some mental impediment that rendered it
impossible for them to act as moral agents. The same is true
when we judge others morally—if we are informed that they
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suffered from certain malfunctions, such as severe traumas,
we withdraw our moral judgments.

In other words, we are morally justified in treating human marginal
cases differently than normal humans because of special, individual
traits, when it comes to attributing duties to them. But in the case of
deciding whether these marginal humans have rights, Machan’s whole
argument is that we should treat marginal cases not differently but the
same as normal cases.
Thus, Machan blows hot and cold: he wants to say that when
deciding which humans should be held morally responsible, we
should happily embrace the “geometrical” reasoning he rejects above.
In these cases, we should accept that marginal cases are different from
normal cases in ways that have crucial moral implications; that is, we
should treat them differently than normal cases. But when deciding
which humans have rights, we should reject “geometrical” reasoning
and treat marginal humans the same as normal cases.
He can’t have it both ways. Either “geometrical” reasoning is
faulty when handling marginal cases or it’s not faulty when handling
marginal cases. What’s more, this charge of “geometrical” reasoning
fails to defuse all the reductios mentioned above, such as the blind
person’s alleged “right” to drive based on the normal vision of others,
and so on. If we must reject “geometrical” reasoning as Machan
defines it, then a blind human has a right to drive a car, and the
marginal moral agents in our earlier thought experiments lack moral
rights. This again shows that Machan’s premises, when made precise,
have false implications.

6. Environmentalism and “Altruism”
In the third chapter, “A Sound Environmentalism,” Machan calls
for the privatization of public lands. The current state, he urges,
unjustly restricts individual liberty and, importantly, yields poor
environmental management since individuals lack the motivation to
properly care for the land and its inhabitants. Machan details some of
the positive environmental consequences he thinks would follow from
his humans-first environmentalism. For example, he argues that
individuals have a right to avoid pollution, and so potential polluters
have a legal duty to address the problem or be held financially liable
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for damages. These suggestions might provide points of agreement,
and a basis for constructive dialogue, between the individualist and
the more traditional, non-humanistic environmentalist: despite their
philosophical differences, they might be able to agree on more points
of practice than either suspected.
In the final chapter, “Putting Humans First,” he compares some
radical environmentalists to central planners, determining what is best
for everyone from afar without considering differing individual needs
and preferences. To illustrate the problem, he relates being criticized
for driving an SUV, even though that vehicle works best for him, and
tells other amusing anecdotes about his personal life and upbringing.
Most importantly, he objects to those who argue that, in our relations
with animals, humans often should not be put first. Rather, on their
view, animals’ interests in avoiding harms like pain, suffering and
death should come before our interests in eating, wearing and
experimenting on them. Machan (2004a, 116) responds that
“Humans are more important, even better, than animals, and we
deserve the benefits that exploiting animals can provide.”
He calls views that deny this principle “altruistic” and calls this
kind of altruism “insidious and perverse” (118). We need to take a
close look at Machan’s suggestion that not exploiting animals amounts
to “altruism” because self-sacrifice, or “altruism,” carries negative
philosophical baggage for his Objectivist readers. Reacting to an essay
by Peter Singer in the New York Review of Books, Machan writes:
Singer [and other animal advocates] could not promise that
“we will become healthier, or enjoy life more, if we cease
exploiting animals. Animal Liberation will require greater
altruism on the part of mankind than any other liberation
movement, since animals are incapable of demanding it for
themselves, or of protesting against their exploitation by
votes, demonstrations, or bombs.” . . . Singer goes on to ask,
rhetorically one may assume, whether “man is capable of
such genuine altruism? Who knows? If this book does have
a significant effect, however, it will be a vindication of all
those who have believed that man has within himself the
potential for more than cruelty and selfishness.” (115)
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But then Machan adds, “So what is called for, if we believe Singer, is
not merely humane treatment of members of the nonhuman animal
world but, literally, human self-sacrifice. . . . For Singer, altruism
requires that we take other animals as our priority as we conduct
ourselves in our lives. We’re supposed to sacrifice our well-being for
the sake of the guppies and lizards” (116).
We need to keep two things in mind here. First, even Singer does
not claim that animals come first. He has stated in many places that
by his utilitarian calculus, humans will often count for more than
animals. This is because, on his view, many humans can experience
pleasure and pain at a more rich and complex level than animals. As
Mill, another famous utilitarian said, “It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.” So, by suggesting that Singer is
putting animals’ interests above those of humans, Machan is either
attacking another strawman or revealing his misunderstanding of what
Singer’s views actually are. Furthermore, Singer is probably using the
term in such a way that relinquishing any “selfish” interest-seeking
amounts to “altruism.”
If this is the case, Objectivist readers must be careful not to
assume that Singer is calling for “altruism” in the Randian sense. The
fact is, if it’s morally wrong to treat animals in certain ways, as a wide
range of ethicists have argued (successfully, in our view), then to
refrain from treating animals in those ways is not genuinely “altruistic”
in any meaningful sense of the word, even if refraining results in some
(real or perceived) loss to the people who used to exploit them. If
slave-owners in the late nineteenth century lost some (real or
perceived) economic value because they stopped using slave labor, it
doesn’t follow that refraining from exploiting slaves amounts to
“altruism” or self-sacrifice in the sense that Rand and other Objectivists define that term. No matter what Singer or Machan says, simply
observing our moral duties or respecting the rights of others is not
genuine self-sacrifice in the Randian sense. Refraining from exploiting animals is altruism only if it is morally permissible to harm animals
in ways they so often are harmed, but that’s the very point at issue.
So, to object to animal rights by saying it’s “altruistic” is to beg the
question by merely assuming that routine harms to animals, such as
those mentioned above, are morally permissible.
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7. Conclusion: A Friend of Animals in Disguise?
What implications does Machan’s book have for our treatment of
animals? A common concession from critics of animal rights,
especially those in the libertarian and Objectivist camp, is to say,
“Sure, exploiting animals might be immoral, but that’s not the same
thing as saying animals have rights. Likewise, it may be immoral to
cheat on your boyfriend or girlfriend, but it doesn’t follow that you
have a right not to be cheated on.” Then they suggest that the
distinguishing feature between violating a right and merely committing
an immoral act is that you can use force to protect a right but not to
prevent an immoral act. Therefore, whether to exploit animals is an
important personal choice, but no person or group, such as government, can force anyone else to refrain from exploiting animals as if
they had a right not to be exploited.
Machan appears to be going down this road when he says, “Is it
wrong to use animals for certain nonvital purposes? Quite likely,
ethically, but this is not the same conclusion as holding that animals
have rights” (21). But on the next page he takes a most surprising
turn:
Should there, nevertheless, be laws against certain kinds of
cruelty to animals? This is not something I am willing to
address fully here. Suffice it to say that, for my part, I would
not necessarily take exception if someone were to rescue an
animal being treated with cruelty, even if this amounted to
invading someone’s private property. If one spotted a
neighbor torturing his cat, albeit on his own private property,
one could well be morally remiss in failing to invade the place
and rescue the animal. (22)
This is a remarkable statement in a book that claims to “put humans
first” and argues that no animals have rights. For if humans have a
duty not to treat cats in a “cruel” way (whatever behavior that
includes), and if a moral agent is not only permitted, but obligated, to
override the property rights of a person who treats a cat in this way to
forcibly prevent the abuse, what does this cat have if not a right not
to be treated cruelly?
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Furthermore, this admission surprisingly entails that some animals
have rights, on Machan’s conception of rights. Recall his statement
above that “To have a right means to be justified in preventing those
who have the choice from intruding on one within a given sphere of
jurisdiction” (5). The cat case seems to be one where Machan admits
that such intrusion would be justified; that, on his view, entails that
the cat has some moral rights, perhaps the right not to be harmed
needlessly. And if such a cat has rights, then surely chickens, cows,
pigs, and the other animals who humans routinely exploit have such
rights too. That would seem to justify the view that, at least, much (if
not all) animal agribusiness and the fur industry is morally wrong and
ought to be eliminated because they violate these animals’ rights.
Indeed, it should be even easier to establish that using animals for
food and clothing is “needless” than to establish that torturing the cat
is needless: we can easily find clothing and food (including some very
realistic meat analogues) in today’s free market.
Machan concedes that most uses of animals are not for necessity
but merely for convenience and sport, that is, for entertainment,
presumably including culinary entertainment (19). And even though
he thinks animals don’t have strictly speaking moral rights, it is still
quite likely wrong to use them for certain “nonvital” purposes (21).
Again these insights seem to justify the conclusion that the vast
majority of uses of animals in the food and fashion industries, being
“nonvital,” are quite likely wrong, especially in light of the direct
harms for human health and indirect harms through environmental
contamination. On the other hand, Machan claims that developing
some human potentials may justify inflicting suffering on animals, as
might other “rational” purposes (20, 118). What sort of purposes and
potentials might justify such harms? Unfortunately, we aren’t given
any guidance.
One thing is clear: whichever ethical terms we use to describe it,
Machan’s statement about the cruelly treated cat, if correct, entails
that as moral agents, we have a duty to forcibly prevent the vast
majority of factory farming, dubious animal experiments, fur production, and dozens of other practices that can only be described as cruel
and nonvital, to use Machan’s own terms. Thus, it would seem that
Machan does not believe that humans should always come first, and
the Animal and Earth Liberation Fronts, as well as more moderate
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animal and environmental advocates, have found an ally in a most
surprising place.
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Notes
1. For an overview of the recent literature on ethical issues pertaining to
animals, see Taylor 2003. For arguments from utilitarianism, see, among other
sources, Singer 1993, which does not meet strict utilitarian qualifications, and Singer
2001, which does; from rights-based deontology, see Regan 2004a, as well as the
more accessible Regan 2004b; from Rawlsian-style ideal contractarianism, see
Rowlands 2002; from virtue ethics, see Hursthouse 2000; from common-sense
morality, see Bernstein 2004 and DeGrazia 2002; from religious moralities, see Scully
2003; from feminism, see Adams and Donavan 1996.
2. For sources and additional information, see Regan 2004b, and Singer 2001.
Also see, for example, the investigative films produced by Compassionate Consumers
(WegmansCruelty.com), Compassion over Killing (COK.net), Farm Sanctuary
(FarmSanctuary.org), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETATV.com), Tribe
of Heart (TribeofHeart.org), among other sources. Animal use industries generally do
not produce films showing the details of their practices. For interesting exceptions,
however, see “Veal Farm Tour” at <http://www.vealfarm.com/veal-farm-tour/>
and the Fur Commission’s “Excellence Through Humane Care,” “What Can I Say?”
and “Chow Time” at <http:// www.furcommission.com/video>. For a list of
animal-use industry webpages, see the references in Regan 2004b.
3. For further discussion of the notion of “negative rights” and why Machan’s
(earlier) arguments failed to show that no animals have them, see Graham 2004.
4. For further elaboration on these objections below, see Hadley 2004.
5. For further discussion of moral mistakes in appealing to what’s “normal,”
see Nobis 2004. Nobis writes:
Tibor Machan claims, for Cohen-esque reasons, that humans’ use of
animals is permissible because doing so makes “the best use of nature for
our success in living our lives” (see Machan 2002, 11). He notes that we
also might benefit from using (marginal) humans, but does not explain
why that would be wrong. He merely states that “as far as infants or the
significantly impaired among human beings are concerned, they cannot be
the basis for a general account of human morality, of what rights human
beings have. Borderline cases matter in making difficult decisions but not
in forging a general theory.” That might be true, but these remarks
provide no reason to think that marginal humans have rights and animals
don’t, so Machan’s views remain incomplete and undefended. (Nobis
2004, 59 n. 32)
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